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0. Introduction 
 Ethical theory is steeped in two related metaphors: reasons have weight and reasons 
are weighed on a balance scale to determine an act’s deontic status (e.g., whether an act 
is permissible, impermissible, or required).  Such metaphors are implicit in the ubiquitous 
talk of outweighing and the balance of reasons.  The ubiquity of these metaphors gives 
them importance.  If we are going to use or reject them, we should understand the best 
way of cashing them out.  We may find, as I argue in this paper, that we can construct a 
promising model of how reasons interact to determine deontic status simply by cashing 
them out carefully. 
 I assume that the metaphors of weight and weighing are apt for morality and practical 
rationality.  So understood, substantive moral (rational) theories can make two kinds of 
mistake.  First, a theory might incorrectly weight reasons.  Perhaps, for example, it 
overestimates how much weight morality gives to self-interest.  Second, a substantive 
theory might weigh reasons incorrectly.  In principle, a theory might make one kind of 
mistake without making the other. 
 This paper is after the fundamental model of weighing reasons to determine a 
deontic status, the model that determines what it is to weigh reasons correctly.  Such a 
model can represent any normative theory that correctly weighs reasons, even if the 
theory incorrectly weights them.  It can’t represent any theory that incorrectly weighs 
reasons.  By identifying what it is to weigh reasons correctly, the fundamental model 
identifies structural constraints on any substantive moral or rational theory.   
 The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double-pan balance) 
scale.  The reasons for φ (Rφ) go in one pan and the reasons for ~φ (R~φ) go in the other. 
The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two sides of the scale, 
determine the deontic status of the act.   
 
fig. 1 
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This model, Single Scale, is not by itself a complete normative theory.  Among other 
things, it must be combined with a function that assigns relative weights to deontic status.  
A natural assignment is: 
Max: you are permitted to φ iff your reasons for φ are at least as weighty as your 
reasons for ~φ; you are required to φ iff your reasons for φ are weightier than 
your reasons for ~φ; otherwise, φ is impermissible. 
Alternatively, one might allow an act to be permissible as long as the reasons for φ are 
“good enough,” even if they are, within limits, outweighed by the reasons for ~φ. 
 Another common metaphor is the single vector sum, where the deontic status of an 
act is determined by comparing the total force (aka pressure) in one direction (toward 
permissibility) with the total force in the opposite direction (toward impermissibility).  
There is no competition between these metaphors.  For normative purposes, talk of 
weight, force, and pressure are rightly taken to be interchangeable.  You put an object on 
the φ-pan.  Its weight just is the downward force it exerts on the φ-pan and the upward 
force that it exerts on the ~φ-pan.  In the physical world, forces can be exerted on an 
object in any direction: up, down, left, right, backwards, forwards, and everything in 
between.  The balance scale is just a convenient way to focus our attention on two 
opposing directions: down (toward permissibility) and up (toward impermissibility).1 
 When understood as an attempt to capture the fundamental model of weighing 
reasons, Single Scale is simple and intuitive.  It can also represent a wider range of 
normative theories than you might think.  Nonetheless, Single Scale has a serious 
representational limitation.  As a reason pushes φ down toward permissibility (has 
justifying weight for φ), it pushes the alternative up toward impermissibility (has 
requiring weight for φ).  In other words, Single Scale assumes Single Proportion (first 
pass): all reasons have the same proportion of justifying and requiring weight.  We’ll see 
that this assumption prevents Single Scale from being able to represent certain normative 
theories, such as the existence of dilemmas, the standard account of supererogation, and 
certain satisficing theories. 
 You might think it is a plus for Single Scale that it can’t represent such theories; 
however, it is a problem insofar as Single Scale is an attempt to capture the fundamental 
model of weighing reasons.  The problem is not (merely) that one or more of the theories 
is true.  Even if they are all false, Single Scale still misconstrues why they are false.  It 
claims that they misunderstand what it is to weigh reasons in order to determine a deontic 
verdict.  Yet if these theories are false, their mistake is about the weights that certain 
reasons have, not how to weigh them.  If Single Scale isn’t the fundamental model, then 
its use must be justified.  It must be shown that, given its relation to the fundamental 
model, Single Scale won’t distort the normative phenomena it is used to model. 
 Single Scale fails to capture the fundamental model of weighing reasons, not because 
it appeals to the image of a scale, but because it appeals to the image of a single scale.  
We need two scales.  The first scale determines whether an act is permissible by 
 
1 ‘Strength’ is also used interchangeably with ‘weight’ and ‘force’.  Strength, though, does have one 
connotation that I want to ignore in this paper.  I can have the strength to lift the box (put enough upward 
force on the box to lift it off the floor) even if I don’t exert that strength on the box.  This connotation is 
useful in contexts where we are trying to distinguish between reasons that you possess and reasons that you 
don’t possess (forthcoming, §3).  When the weight of a reason is on a pan, there is no question as to whether 
it exerts force on the pan or whether it is relevant to an action’s deontic status. 
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comparing the justifying weight for an act and the requiring weight for the alternative.  
The second scale determines whether an act is a commitment by comparing the requiring 
weight for the act and the justifying weight for the alternative.  (φ is a commitment iff 
~φ is impermissible.)  The two scales working together determine whether φ is a 
requirement or a dilemma.  (φ is a requirement iff φ is both permissible and a 
commitment.  φ is a dilemma iff φ is both impermissible and a commitment.)   
 This model, Dual Scale, can represent justifying and requiring weight as dependent 
variables.  This is just another way of saying that it can represent normative theories 
which assume that Single Proportion is true.  Values that always come in the same 
proportion don’t need to be tracked independently: if you know the value of one, then 
you are able to calculate the value of the other.  Thus, Dual Scale can represent everything 
Single Scale can represent—and arguably represent it better.  It can also represent 
justifying and requiring weight as independent variables.  This is just another way of 
saying that it can represent normative theories that reject Single Proportion.  When values 
don’t always come in the same proportion, you must track them independently insofar as 
you can’t calculate the value of one from the value of the other.  Thus, it can represent 
what Single Scale can’t.   
 As I present it here, Dual Scale inherits three limitations from Single Scale.  First, it 
focuses on a simple choice context in which there are just two options, φ and ~φ.  Second, 
it assumes that every reason against φ is some sort of reason for ~φ, which some regard 
as a problematic assumption (Snedegar 2018).  Finally, it is susceptible to certain holist 
challenges.  I will identify these limitations as they become relevant and, usually in 
footnotes, briefly explain how Dual Scale needs to be refined to resolve them.  These 
refinements would vindicate scale-based models from the most pressing objections; 
however, full defense of these refinements, the metaphor of a reason’s weight, and the 
metaphor of weighing reasons on scales must wait for another occasion.   
 The simple version of Dual Scale presented here nonetheless approximates the 
fundamental model of weighing reasons.  As an approximation, it helps us to better 
understand the structural constraints on any theory of morality, rationality, and any other 
normative perspective that is structured by the metaphors of weight and weighing.  
 In §1, I present Single Scale.  In §2, I refine Gert’s justifying/requiring weight 
distinction and show that it is unavoidable as long as we assume that reasons have weight.  
Dual Scale and my criticism of Single Scale, in a way, just systematically develop and 
apply this refined distinction.2  In §3, I explain what Single Scale can represent and how 
it can represent it.  This explanation will clarify Single Proportion, the component that 
prevents Single Scale from representing even more.  In §4, I show that the commitment 
to Single Proportion prevents Single Scale from representing a range of normative 
theories.  In §5, I explain why these representational failures reveal that Single Scale isn’t 
the fundamental model.  In §6, I present Dual Scale.  In §7, I highlight Dual Scale’s 
advantages and show that it can represent the three theories that Single Scale can’t 
represent.  It has a lot in common with Single Scale, but it has a much better claim to 
being the fundamental model of weighing reasons. 
 
2 Gert generally uses the distinction to make trouble for views he rejects, including something like Single 
Proportion (2007: 536-7).  Yet he never systematically develops the distinction into a model of weighing 
reasons (see 2004: 73-79 for his most explicit discussion), and some of his claims about the distinction are 
incompatible with my model (§2.1).  For other differences between our views, see nt 26, and nt 43. 
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 When our best image/metaphor for weighing reasons is Single Scale, Single 
Proportion seems like a default assumption of normative inquiry, if not a constraint on 
the coherent weighing of reasons.  In §8, I argue that unjustified reliance on Single Scale 
has made it difficult for philosophers to even make sense of theories that reject Single 
Proportion.  Dual Scale shows decisively that we can make sense of such theories.3  
 
1. Single Scale 
 Single Scale is the conjunction of four theses.  These theses are implications of taking 
the single scale metaphor seriously.  The first implication begins with the observation that 
the options, φ and ~φ, are represented by the scale itself, more specifically, by the two 
pans.  In fig. 1 above, the left pan is φ and the right pan is ~φ.  Since one’s reasons don’t 
influence the shape or structure of the pans, the scale (the individuated options) is prior 
to, and so independent of, what goes on the scale (reasons): 
Independent Individuation of Options: an agent’s options are individuated 
independently of what reasons the agent has and what the weights of those 
reasons are.4 
Independent Individuation of Options is a constraint on how options are to be 
individuated.  This constraint has important implications,5 but a complete theory of option 
individuation is itself not part of Single Scale.   
 Any plausible theory of option individuation will allow one to be in a situation with 
three or more options.  I focus, however, on the case in which we have two options, φ and 
~φ.  Generalizing Single (and Dual) Scale to handle any number of options raises 
complications that I won’t be able to address here.6  
 The second implication restricts what goes on the scale.  To whatever extent 
something counts in favor of φ (pushes down the φ-pan), it also counts against ~φ (pushes 
up the ~φ-pan).  In §2.2, we’ll discuss this implication under the label Single Proportion.  
The model is otherwise largely noncommittal about what goes on the scale.  A natural 
assumption is that all and only reasons for φ go on the φ-pan and all and only reasons for 
~φ go on the ~φ-pan.  We’ll refine this assumption in light of a certain alternative to Max 
(§4), but it’ll do for now. 
 The third implication restricts which factors make a difference to an act’s deontic 
status.  Deontic status is a function of the relative heights of the pans, and so: 
Weight Comparativism: An action’s deontic status is determined solely by the 
relative weights of all reasons for and against it.7 
 
3 Despite what Portmore (2011: 137-143) may think, his dual ranking theory and principle META do not 
show that we can make sense of the standard account of supererogation, at least not without the help of 
Dual Scale.  They are meta-principles linking two normative perspectives, morality and rationality.  Those 
principles presuppose that, within the single normative perspective of morality, there is a model of weighing 
reasons that can make sense of the standard account of supererogation.  It is good news for Portmore that 
he is unwittingly committed to Dual Scale (see nt 38 below). 
4 Cf. Snedegar (2018: 726). 
5 For example, it blocks Rubio’s (2018) Satan’s Apple Paradox, which depends on using which reasons a 
divine being has as a constraint on what can be an option for a divine agent. 
6 See nt 39 for a brief discussion. 
7 Weight Comparativism is similar to what Chang (2016: 215) calls “Comparativism (reasons version).”  
Cf. Portmore (2019: 8-11). 
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Weight Comparativism claims that the weights of the relevant reasons and only these 
weights determine the deontic status of a particular action.  And these weights don’t 
determine the deontic status in any old way: it is the relative weight of the reasons for and 
against an action that determine its deontic status.  Different versions of Single Scale will 
endorse different assignments of relative weights to deontic status.  Max is a particularly 
demanding assignment, but we’ll soon consider some less demanding alternatives.  
 The fourth implication concerns the analogy with weight.  Things with weight exhibit 
counterfactual stability across contexts.  If my phone is heavier than my pen, then 
whatever scale you put them on, in whatever room you’re in, the phone will exert more 
downward force than my pen.  If reasons have counterfactual stability, then it may seem 
that they have the same weight—they exert the same force in the same valence—across 
all contexts.  These fixed weights are determined prior to determining the deontic status 
of any particular action, because reasons have a given weight before you put them on the 
scale.  The fourth implication, then, is: 
Prior Fixed Weight: the same reason has the same weight in all contexts, and 
what particular weight it has is prior to the deontic status of any particular action. 
If something is a reason, then it has some weight or another.  What particular weight it 
has includes its valence (weight toward permissibility vs weight toward impermissibility) 
as well as just how weighty it is for (against) an act.  Thus, Prior Fixed Weight entails 
that if something is a reason with a specific weight, it is always a reason with that weight.  
If it doesn’t have a weight, then it isn’t a reason in any context.8   
 If Prior Fixed Weight is true, it holds only for some privileged way of individuating 
reasons.  Single Scale does not itself take a stand on exactly what this privileged way is, 
but it likely involves at least a restriction to fundamental, non-derived, or basic reasons 
(Gert 2004: 77-79; Nair 2016: 94-5).9 
 There is a fifth implication of the weighing metaphor, but I don’t build it into Single 
Scale.  The weight of everything on a pan just is the sum total weight of each individual 
thing on the pan.  By analogy, we get additive aggregation: the weight of all the reasons 
for φ just is the sum total weight of the individual reasons for φ.10   There are many 
worries about additive aggregation,11 and I don’t want these worries to distract you.  The 
 
8 Dancy (2004: 105, 190); Gert (2004: 73-77, 2007); cf. Berker (2007, especially 122-4).  Elsewhere I argue 
that if holism is compatible with Single (Dual) Scale, the counterfactual stability of weight must be 
compatible with the idea that a reason’s weight can vary according to context (cf. Cullity 2018: 425-7).  
This compatibility would require some refinement to Prior Fixed Weight. 
9 That a given restaurant exclusively serves Thai food might be a reason for me to go and a reason for you 
to refrain from going.  At first glance, this is a violation of Prior Fixed Weights since the valence of 
exclusively serving Thai food seems to vary according to who the diner is.  Yet exclusively serving Thai 
food probably won’t make our list of fundamental or basic reasons.  It is a derived reason, i.e., it is a reason 
only insofar as it bears a certain relation to a fundamental reason, such as its promoting someone’s 
wellbeing or pleasure.  Even if Prior Fixed Weights applies to basic reasons, we should not expect it to hold 
of derived reasons precisely because the same thing (Thai food) can bear different causal relations 
(promote/prevent) to a given basic reason (pleasure). 
10 See, e.g., Dancy 2004: 9-10, 190 and Snedegar 2018: 725-743; cf. Berker 2007: 122-3. 
11 A common worry about additive aggregation is that it will double-count some reasons.  Consider, for 
example, the reasons it would cause pain and it would cause severe pain (cf. Kearns’ 2016: 186; Maguire 
and Snedegar forthcoming: 6 EV).  This seems to be a counterexample to additive aggregation, but it’s not.  
Elsewhere I argue that it’s a counterexample to the claim that the correct aggregation principle—whether 
additive or not—takes all reasons as inputs.  Although they don’t put the point this way, I take it that this 
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other four implications can survive even if additive aggregation does not.  Just keep in 
mind that Single Scale needs to be combined with whatever the true aggregation principle 
happens to be. 
 Single Scale is the conjunction of Independent Individuation of Options, Single 
Proportion, Weight Comparativism, and Prior Fixed Weights.  There are well-known 
holist challenges to Single Scale.  If conditions (enablers, disablers) or modifiers 
(amplifiers, attenuators) exist, then a reason’s weight is partly determined by its context.  
Singe Scale denies this context-sensitivity, as will Dual Scale.  Single (Dual) Scale can 
and should be refined to allow for this context-sensitivity, but I save these refinements 
for another occasion.12  (A holist version of Single Scale is still committed to Single 
Proportion, roughly, that justifying and requiring weight always come in the same 
proportion.  So it too suffers from the problem I develop for the non-holist version.) 
 
2. Justifying and Requiring Weight 
 To understand Single Scale’s problem and Dual Scale’s promise, we need a nuanced 
understanding of the justifying/requiring weight distinction. 
 
2.1. Justifying and Requiring Weight as Opposing Forces 
 A consideration has justifying weight for φ iff the consideration makes it permissible 
to φ in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing considerations (more precisely: 
sufficiently weighty requiring weight for ~φ).  The fact that eating this cookie will make 
me happy has justifying weight insofar as it is a consideration that pushes eating the 
cookie toward permissibility.  A consideration has requiring weight for φ iff it makes 
~φ impermissible in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing considerations 
(more precisely: sufficiently weighty justifying weight for ~φ).  If stopping the car is the 
only way to avoid killing one of the children playing in the street, then you have a reason 
for stopping that has requiring weight, a reason that pushes the alternative (not stopping) 
toward impermissibility.13 
 You’ll notice that ‘justifying weight’ and ‘requiring weight’ are inter-defined in 
typical functionalist fashion (cf. Dorsey 2016: 8-12 and especially Gert 2004: ch 4).  
When concepts are a package deal, there is no problem with inter-defining them.  
Consider necessity and possibility.  Conceptually, they seem to be a package deal and so 
 
is the upshot of Gert (2004: 77-79); Bader (2016: 29); Kearns (2016: 186); Nair (2016: 63-70, 94-5); Cullity 
(2018: 424-5); and Maguire and Snedegar (forthcoming). 
12 These refinements tweak Prior Fixed Weight and then clarify that whenever Single (Dual) Scale uses the 
term “weight”, it means the embedded weight of a reason.  A reason’s (better: a ground’s) default weight 
is the weight it has abstracted from all contexts.  A reason’s (better: a ground’s) embedded weight is the 
weight it has when conjoined with a specific set of conditions and modifiers (cf. Bader 2016: 40).  Deontic 
statuses are determined most directly by the embedded weights of reasons, so that’s the weight value that 
we consider when we put reasons on the scale.  Elsewhere I argue that these refinements are enough to 
resolve the most serious holist challenges to Single (Dual) Scale. 
13 Justifying/requiring weight against φ is conceptually equivalent to justifying/requiring weight for ~φ.  
To go back and forth between conceptually equivalent categories of weight, hold fixed whether the weight 
is justifying/requiring and then vary both the for/against and the φ/~φ.  For example, justifying weight 
against φ is conceptually equivalent to justifying weight for ~φ: they both push φ toward permissibility.  
See my manuscript for an account of the for/against distinction and an explanation of how Dual Scale 
handles it.  If you are inclined to reject the justifying/requiring weight distinction because you think the 
reason for/against distinction is all we need, see nt 36 below. 
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they can be inter-defined.  Some proposition P is necessary iff it is not possible that ~P, 
and P is possible iff it is not necessary that ~P.  I am claiming that justifying and requiring 
weight are likewise a package deal.  There is a formal methodology for inter-defining 
terms without vicious circularity, and it is straightforward to restate my definitions using 
that methodology.14 
 To have justifying weight for φ is just to play a certain role in fixing deontic status, 
i.e., pushing φ toward permissibility.  To have requiring weight for ~φ is to play an 
opposing role in fixing deontic status, i.e., pushing φ toward impermissibility.  Hence, 
contrary to what Gert himself asserts (2007: 536), justifying and requiring weight are 
opposing weights/forces to be understood on analogy with downward and upward force.  
Just as the direction of the particle’s movement (or the height of a balance scale pan) is 
determined by a competition between the downward and upward forces exerted on it, the 
permissibility of a particular action is determined by a competition between justifying 
weight for φ and requiring weight for ~φ.  Something’s amount (quantity, magnitude) of 
justifying and/or requiring weight is a way of specifying which role wins the competition 
in a given case.   
 Gert sometimes assumes that, if justifying and requiring weight were independent 
variables, then amounts of justifying and requiring weight would be incomparable (2007: 
537).  This is a mistake.  Downward and upward forces are distinct but comparable: the 
downward force can be greater than, less than, or equal to upward force.  Likewise, 
justifying weight and requiring weight are distinct but comparable: justifying weight for 
φ can be greater than, less than, or equal to requiring weight for ~φ.  This comparability 
is essential for any view of weighing reasons that assigns deontic status in terms of 
relative weights. I’ll have more to say about amounts in §5 and the competition between 
justifying and requiring weight in §6. 
 Following Portmore (2011: 88-9) and Dorsey (2016: 166), I use a thick notion of 
requirement: φ is a requirement iff φ is both permissible and ~φ is impermissible.  I use 
a different term for Gert’s thinner, purely negative notion of requirement: φ is a 
commitment iff ~φ is impermissible.  Commitment to φ is what you add to permission 
to φ in order to make φ required.  Nonetheless—and in contrast to Dorsey (2016: 166)—
I follow Gert in using a thin sense of ‘requiring weight’ that does not entail justifying 
weight.  This lack of entailment is necessary to represent the conceptual possibility of 
dilemmas when an agent has finitely many options (§4.1).  So understood, an undefeated 
requiring reason to φ does not, by definition, entail a requirement to φ (both φ is 
permissible and ~φ is impermissible) but only a commitment to φ (~φ is impermissible).   
Were Gert’s terminology not ingrained in the literature, I would have avoided this 
infelicity by replacing the term “requiring weight” with “committing weight”. 
 
2.2. The Inescapability of the Justifying/Requiring Distinction 
 
14 Lewis (1970) explains how to (inter)define terms by their functional relations to each other.  If you are 
familiar with his framework, you can let ‘permissible’ (ok to do) and ‘impermissible’ (not ok to do) be the 
“Old” terms, defined independently of the theory/functional role.  Justifying weight and requiring weight 
are the “Theoretical” terms defined in terms of their relations to the Old terms and each other.  (Were I 
making Dual Scale compatible with holism, I would also add ‘enabler’, ‘disabler’, and other holist notions 
as Theoretical terms.) 
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 Given the assumption that reasons have weight, the conceptual distinction between 
justifying and requiring weight is inescapable and should be uncontroversial.15  We all 
agree—or at least I assume—that some actions are permissible and that some are required.  
We also all agree—or at least I assume—that it isn’t brute that an action is permissible or 
required.  Actions are made permissible (required) because they are supported by reasons 
that make them permissible (required).  Yet, once you admit the existence of reasons that 
make an act permissible, you thereby admit that those reasons have justifying weight 
(push the act toward permissibility).  When you admit the existence of reasons that make 
an act required (both permissible and a commitment), you thereby admit that those 
reasons have requiring weight (push the act’s alternatives toward impermissibility). 
 If the conceptual distinction should be as uncontroversial as I make it out to be, then 
you may wonder why the distinction is not more widely understood and appreciated.  
Well, many normative theorists begin normative theorizing by assuming that justifying 
and requiring weight come in the same proportion.  The assumption is so deep that many 
don’t even recognize it as such.  (I ultimately blame Single Scale for this predicament in 
§8.)  If justifying and requiring weight always come in the same proportion—if they are 
dependent variables—then we don’t need to track them independently.  Perhaps, for 
example, a single factor plays both roles: the greater the single factor (e.g., the greater the 
aggregate net wellbeing), the greater the justifying and requiring weight.  As long as we 
track this single factor, we don’t need to think of ourselves as tracking justifying and 
requiring weight to describe normative reality.  We can think of ourselves as tracking 
something more generic, such as the single factor itself, the (unqualified) pressure 
for/against an option, or the (unqualified) weight of the reasons for/against it.  
 In other words, insofar as we assume that justifying and requiring weight always come 
in the same proportion, we thereby assume that the distinction is insignificant for 
substantive normative theorizing.  Yet we do not thereby assume it out of existence.  Nor 
do we thereby make the distinction irrelevant to the fundamental model of weighing 
reasons.  Polygon with exactly three sides and polygon with exactly three internal angles 
pick out conceptually distinct features of all and only triangles.  Likewise, justifying and 
requiring weight pick out conceptually distinct roles that a reason can play—even if all 
and only reasons play these roles and even if the two roles always co-vary.  As I illustrate 
in §5, there are conceptual truths about how these roles interact, and these conceptual 
truths provide structural constraints on substantive normative theorizing.   
 While the justifying/requiring distinction itself should be uncontroversial, it is 
controversial which considerations have some sort of weight.  The maximizing act 
utilitarian says that a stranger’s wellbeing has both justifying and requiring weight and 
the ethical egoist says that it has neither.  A different controversial issue—and one at the 
heart of this paper—is which proportions of justifying and requiring weight that a given 
reason can have.  In principle, two normative theories can agree about which things have 
 
15 Some of the more fine-grained details are, however, up for negotiation.  For example, my definitions 
entail that any amount, no matter how little, of undefeated requiring weight for φ makes φ a commitment.  
One might opt instead for a notion of requiring weight that demands a certain amount n of undefeated 
requiring weight for φ before φ becomes a commitment.  But you’ll still need the functionalism to ensure 
that the concepts—‘(amounts of) justifying weight’, ‘(amounts of) requiring weight’—are properly 
coordinated and neutral between rival (conceptually possible) accounts of what plays the role picked out 
by each concept. 
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weight and disagree about what proportion of justifying and requiring weight each reason 
has.   
 
3. The Limits of What Single Scale can Represent 
 In this section, we consider the full range of what Single Scale can represent and how 
it can represent what it can represent.  This consideration will clarify Single Proportion, 
the component of Single Scale that prevents it from representing even more. 
 Single Scale is limited in which proportions of justifying and requiring weight that it 
can represent, because the φ-pan goes down (toward permissibility) only insofar as the 
~φ-pan goes up (toward impermissibility).  Single Scale may seem to entail, then, that a 
reason must have exactly the same amount of justifying weight (weight toward φ’s 
permissibility) and requiring weight (weight toward ~φ’s impermissibility).  In other 
words, it may seem that Single Scale can represent only balanced requiring reasons, 
i.e., reasons that have exactly as much requiring weight as they have justifying weight.  It 
isn’t that limited, however. 
 Some elements of Single Scale are represented visually or “on the image of the scale”.  
The pans represent the options, for example.  Yet some elements are “off-image”.  The 
assignment of relative weights to deontic status is not represented visually, though the 
visual elements do rule out some assignments (see §5 below).16  Max is one assignment 
function compatible with Single Scale.  It holds that an act is permissible iff it is an act 
for which one has the greatest (or tied for the greatest) balance of reasons.  Non-
maximizing, or satisficing, versions of Single Scale hold that an act is permissible as long 
as there is a good enough balance of reasons in its favor. 
  For Single Scale, the assignment of relative weights to deontic status is tightly 
correlated with which kind(s) of reasons are represented.  (The parallel point won’t hold 
for Dual Scale, which has richer representational resources.)  For example, Max requires 
that all reasons that go on the pans be balanced requiring reasons, that all such reasons 
push an act toward permissibility exactly to the extent that they push the alternatives 
toward impermissibility.  It is this feature of Max that ensures that one is not permitted to 
φ whenever the reasons against it outweigh (even by the smallest margin) the reasons for 
it.  Single Scale can also represent two other kinds of reasons and is, therefore, compatible 
with two importantly different kinds of satisficing.     
 Consider a view that holds that reasons are always justifying heavy requiring 
reasons, i.e., reasons with both justifying and requiring weight but more of the former 
than the latter.  For illustration, let’s say they have twice as much justifying weight as 
requiring weight.  Single Scale can represent such a view using:  
Relative Weight Satisficing: φ is permissible iff the reasons against φ are no more 
than twice as heavy as the reasons for φ. 
On the scale, there will be some height differential that represents the reasons against φ 
as being twice as heavy as the reasons for φ.  Relative Weight Satisficing holds that this 
“twice as heavy point”, not the counterbalanced point, is the threshold for permissibility.  
So Single Scale can represent justifying heavy requiring reasons if they always have the 
same proportion of justifying and requiring weight. 
 
16 Conditions and modifiers will also be represented off-image, if the response to holist challenges I suggest 
in note 12 is on the right track. 
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 Single Scale can even model a special case of reasons that have different proportions 
of justifying and requiring weight.  Perhaps an act comes with a “default cushion of 
permissibility”.  That is, perhaps there is a default reason (a reason to choose any action 
in any situation) and this default reason is merely justifying—it has justifying but not 
requiring weight.  Assume the default justifying weight is five units. 
 Recall that the image of the scale doesn’t itself say that all reasons go on the scale 
(§1) and that some elements of a complete model must be represented off-image.  We 
might suggest, then, that the default reason to choose an action is represented off-image 
in the assignment of relative weights to deontic status.  What goes on the scale are all and 
only relevant non-default reasons, which we can suppose are balanced requiring reasons.  
We can represent this combination of merely justifying default reasons and non-default 
balanced requiring reasons using: 
Default Reason Satisficing: it is permissible to φ iff the reasons for φ are not 
outweighed by at least 5 units. 
Thus, Single Scale can allow default reasons to have a different proportion of justifying 
and requiring weight than non-default reasons.  
 Ethicists don’t normally talk about default reasons or default biases toward 
permissibility, but one way to motivate prerogatives might be recast in these terms.  Some 
motivate prerogatives by appealing to partiality or relationships (I have the prerogative 
to give my wellbeing extra weight).  Set that idea aside.  Others motivate it by appealing 
to agential autonomy: all moral agents are autonomous and the value of their autonomy 
explains why they can self-direct even if their preferred direction is, within limits, 
outweighed by opposing reasons.  The “within limits” can be given a default reason 
reading.  If you think of reasons as facts, the default reason of five units might be that the 
agent is autonomous or that φ is an available act.17 
 Relative Weight Satisficing and Default Reason Satisficing are less demanding than 
Max because they allow for a cushion of permissibility, i.e., they allow the total justifying 
weight to outstrip the total requiring weight in favor of an act.  The bigger this cushion, 
the more the balance of reasons can be against the act and it still be permissible.  Relative 
Weight Satisficing represents a proportional cushion: the more total justifying weight, 
the bigger the cushion.  If the total justifying weight is 10, then the total requiring weight 
is 5 (a difference of 5).  If the total justifying weight is 100, the total requiring weight is 
50 (a difference of 50).  Default Reason Satisficing represents a fixed cushion: the 
difference is always 5.  No matter what the total justifying weight is, the total requiring 
 
17 It is not crucial that we think of default biases as default reasons.  I think of them that way because I hold 
that: (i) a default bias toward permissibility makes an act permissible in the absence of sufficiently weighty 
requiring weight for the alternative; (ii) by the definition of justifying weight for an act (§2.1), it follows 
that default biases have justifying weight for an act; and (iii) anything that has justifying weight for an act 
is a reason for that act.  All of (i)-(iii) are negotiable (recall, for example, nt 15).  What is non-negotiable 
for the fundamental model is that it takes default biases into account; that it is able to represent 
disagreements about the size and valence of the bias; and that the size of the default bias is measurable by 
how much opposing weight it takes to overcome it. 
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weight is 5 units less.18  Thus, Single Scale can represent two importantly different kinds 
of satisficing (and three if you count their combination).19 
 If we can represent default reasons “off-image”, one might wonder whether any sort 
of reason can be represented off-image and so wonder whether Single Proportion has any 
representational limitations at all.  In reply, default reasons really are a special case.   
 Consider two features of combining Single Scale with Max.  The first feature is that 
all variation is on-image.  Regardless of which action and situation we consider, the only 
variation is which reasons go on the pans.  Default Reason Satisficing captures this feature 
too.  The only reasons that are represented off-image are default reasons which apply to 
every act in every situation.  Consequently, all variation between different actions and 
situations is captured on-image by considering which (non-default) reasons go on the 
scales.  Once you start to move variations in the reasons off-image, the less the image of 
a single scale is being used as a model for weighing reasons. 
 Second, Max is biased toward permissibility.  When the reasons for and against are 
counterbalanced or there are no reasons either way, the act is permissible.  Not 
impermissible, not undefined.  The default reason picture agrees that there is a bias toward 
permissibility, but it objects that the bias is 5 units weightier than Max recognizes.   
 While default reasons might sound exotic, it is to Single Scale’s credit that it can 
represent them.  We can intelligibly disagree about both whether there is a default bias 
toward permissibility20 and how weighty that bias is.  The fundamental model of 
weighing reasons should be able to represent such disagreements. 
 As one pan goes down, the other pan goes up.  At first glance, this feature suggests 
that all reasons must be balanced requiring reasons, reasons that have justifying weight 
for φ exactly to the extent that they have requiring weight for φ.  We’ve seen, however, 
that Single Scale can represent justifying heavy requiring reasons (reasons with both 
kinds of weight but more justifying weight), as long as reasons always have the same 
proportion.  We’ve also seen that Single Scale can represent views that give default 
reasons a different proportion than non-default reasons.  Here, then, is the representational 
limitation of the image of a single scale: 
Single Proportion: all non-default reasons have the same proportion of justifying 
and requiring weight. 
In other words, Single Scale cannot allow the justifying and requiring weight of non-
default reasons to be independent variables.  This limitation prevents Single Scale from 
being the fundamental model of how reasons are to be weighed. 
 
4. What Single Scale Can’t Represent 
 In this section, I show that Single Scale’s commitment to Single Proportion prevents 
it from representing the existence of dilemmas, the standard account of supererogation, 
and certain versions of satisficing.  In the next section, I explain why these 
 
18 If an agent’s autonomy gives them a fixed cushion of permissibility, then that is all the more reason to 
think of autonomy-grounded prerogatives as default reasons. 
19 If you combine both forms of satisficing, you’ll get a more complex equation: an act is permissible as 
long as it is at least [½(greatest balance) – 5]. 
20 While it is common to assume that actions are permissible by default, the standard view in epistemology 
is that (dis)beliefs are impermissible by default.  This standard view is revealed by how controversial 
doxastic (aka: epistemic) conservatism is, where doxastic conservatism is just the view that beliefs are 
rational/justified/reasonable by default. 
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representational failures are a problem for Single Scale insofar as it is an attempt to 
capture the fundamental model of weighing reasons.21  
 
4.1. Failure 1: Can’t Properly Represent Dilemmas 
 Dilemmas are cases in which neither φ nor ~φ is permissible.  Dilemmas can’t be 
represented properly in Single Scale.  Comparative Weight requires that we assign 
deontic status in terms of relative weights.22  Max divides relative weights into three 
categories: counterbalanced, reasons to φ are weightier, and reasons to ~φ are weightier.  
There are, however, four conceptually possible deontic combinations: both are 
permissible (deontic option), only φ is permissible (φ is required), only ~φ is permissible 
(~φ is required), and neither are permissible (dilemma).23  Max assigns φ is required to 
weightier reasons for φ, ~φ is required to weightier reasons for ~φ, and both are 
permissible to counterbalanced weights; therefore, dilemma is left out in the cold.   
 We could divide the relative weights into four categories: exactly counterbalanced, 
within 10 units of counterbalanced, reasons to φ are weightier by more than 10 units, and 
reasons for ~φ are weightier by more than 10 units.  This makes conceptual room for 
dilemmas at the cost of normative absurdity.  The difference between whether one is in a 
dilemma or in a deontic option isn’t a difference in whether the reasons are exactly 
counterbalanced or almost counterbalanced.  Whether someone is in a dilemma is a 
function of the particular reasons he has, and perhaps the particular failures that he’s 
made.  Consider the case in which a first time cheater gets his one night stand pregnant 
and must decide between continuing a relationship with the one night stand or his fiancé.  
Whether this case counts as a dilemma doesn’t seem to depend on whether one’s reasons 
are exactly counterbalanced or almost counterbalanced.  This is the wrong way to try to 
settle whether it is a dilemma or a deontic option. 
 Single Scale does capture something important: whether this case counts as dilemma 
depends on the relative weight of reasons.  Dilemmas are cases in which the reasons make 
the alternative, ~φ, impermissible without making φ permissible.  Recall that the above 
two versions of satisficing appeal to justifying heavy reasons, reasons with more 
 
21 When I say ‘Single Scale can’t represent normative theory T’, you may prefer to say ‘Single Scale 
represents normative theory T as impossible’.  The two expressions amount to the same thing for my 
purposes.  Insofar as Single Scale is an attempt to capture the fundamental model of weighing reasons, 
either expression is tantamount to the charge that T is confused about how to weigh reasons. 
22 Note that Comparative Weight rules out allowing trivial cases of counterbalancing (no reasons on either 
pan) to have a different deontic status than non-trivial cases (there are reasons on both pans that are equally 
weighty).  Even if we ignore this implication of Comparative Weight, the distinction between trivial and 
non-trivial counterbalancing won’t provide a normatively satisfactory account of dilemmas.  The most 
promising examples of dilemmas are cases in which an agent seems to have reasons that push in opposite 
directions (like the one time cheater case in the main text).  But some deontic option cases are also cases in 
which different reasons push in opposite directions (e.g., when we choose between altruism and self-
interest). 
23 Some theorists think of supererogation as a deontic status.  I think of it as a deontic/evaluative hybrid: it 
involves a deontic option in which one option is morally better than the other. 
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justifying than requiring weight.24 In contrast, the existence of dilemmas requires 
requiring heavy reasons, i.e. reasons that have more requiring than justifying weight.25   
 One seems to have requiring heavy reasons, if at all, only in very specific 
circumstances, so they can’t be default reasons.  Unless we risk overgeneralizing which 
cases are dilemmas, such reasons better be few and far between: the dilemma generating 
non-default reasons will be requiring heavy, whereas most other (non-default) reasons 
will be balanced or justifying heavy.  Thus, to represent dilemmas in a normatively 
promising way, we need to be able to represent non-default reasons with different 
proportions of justifying and requiring weight.  Yet it is precisely such a possibility that 
Single Proportion rules out.26   
 
4.2. Failure 2: Can’t Represent Standard Account of Supererogation 
 Suppose that Liv jumps on a grenade to save the lives of five other soldiers.  The 
standard account of supererogation holds that Liv’s act is supererogatory.  In a nutshell: 
The lives of the five soldiers have requiring (and justifying) weight, because Liv 
would be morally required to save the five soldiers if she could do so at no cost to 
herself.  Morality is other-centered, so Liv’s own wellbeing lacks requiring 
weight.  She is nonetheless permitted to remain in safety because her life is a very 
weighty merely justifying reason.  Since both alternatives are permissible and it 
is morally better to save the others, she goes “beyond the call of duty” in jumping 
on the grenade.27 
Altruistic and self-interested reasons are ones that we don’t have by default, because the 
costs and benefits to you and others varies from case to case.  Thus, Single Scale can’t 
represent the standard account of supererogation, because it depends on certain non-
default reasons (altruistic ones) having a different proportion of justifying and requiring 
weight than others (self-interested ones).  Altruistic reasons have both justifying and 
requiring weight whereas self-interested reasons have only justifying weight. 
 
 
24 Justifying heavy reasons can be justifying heavy requiring reasons (reasons with both justifying and 
requiring weight but more justifying weight) or merely justifying reasons (reasons that have justifying 
weight but no requiring weight). 
25 More precisely: requiring heavy reasons are needed to properly represent the conceptual possibility of 
dilemmas when there are only finitely many options.  See note 39 for some discussion of dilemmas when 
there are infinitely many options.  Also note that the sort of dilemma that I’m talking about is not due 
different perspectives (morality vs rationality or truth vs epistemic rationality) issuing conflicting all-in 
requirements.  It is due to a single perspective issuing a single combined verdict of impermissible 
commitment. 
26 Irrational aims and unjustified beliefs are another potential source of dilemmas.  Such dilemmas are 
instances of structural irrationality, which is often distinguished from substantive irrationality.  While 
structural irrationality is often explained in terms of the violations of requirements, I agree with Fogal 
(2019) that both structural and substantive irrationality should be explained in terms of pressure, or weight.  
(Here I disagree with Gert, who explains structural irrationality in a different way (e.g., 2004: 69-72).)  Yet 
Fogal underestimates the case for treating structural issues as a proper subset of substantive ones, perhaps 
because he is seduced by Single Scale and its commitment to Single Proportion (2019: 1054).   
27 Portmore (2008; 2011: ch 5) is perhaps the clearest proponent of this account.  His account is assumed 
by Massoud (2016) and Archer (2016).  Similar accounts are given by Clark (1978), Curtis (1981), Muñoz 
(forthcoming), and Raz (1990: 94).  Raz’s response utilizes “exclusionary permissions” rather than merely 
justifying reasons.  Yet “exclusionary permission” seems to be an awkward way of referring to an 
undefeated merely justifying reason (Gert 2004: 107-110). 
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4.3. Failure 3: Good-Centered Satisficing 
 Recall that Single Scale can represent Relative Weight and Default Reason 
Satisficing, versions of weight-centered satisficing.  Such theories understand the ‘good 
enough’ as a threshold in the relative weight of all relevant reasons.  Single Scale cannot 
model what I take to be the most promising form of satisficing, good-centered satisficing.  
This form of satisficing lets the good enough be a threshold, not in the overall relative 
weights, but in an intrinsic good, such as wellbeing. 
 The standard account of supererogation focuses on the supererogatory relief of 
suffering.  It correctly supposes that one has requiring reason to make (a part of) 
someone’s life better when it is (or otherwise would be) poor.  Yet what if someone else’s 
life is already very good?  It is less clear whether there is requiring reason to make their 
life even better.  A proponent of good-centered satisficing might say, then, that we have 
requiring reason to make a life better to the point that it is good enough and only merely 
justifying reason to make it better beyond that point.  The good enough can be given 
absolute (at least 100 units of wellbeing) and relative readings (at least 80% of the most 
wellbeing one can give), though I prefer the absolute reading.  Such a view supposes that 
Single Proportion is false.  For it supposes that the (non-default) reasons provided by 
someone’s wellbeing are sometimes requiring (have requiring strength) and sometimes 
merely justifying (cf. Tucker 2017). 
 One benefit of this kind of satisficing is that it makes possible a kind of supererogation 
that is different from the supererogatory relief of suffering, the sort of supererogation the 
standard account focuses on.  Perhaps there is a sort of supererogation that involves a 
“gratuitous promotion of wellbeing”, a promotion of someone’s wellbeing when such 
promotion isn’t even pro tanto required (cf. Horgan and Timmons 2010).28  The standard 
account holds that the altruistic prevention of five deaths generates a pro tanto 
requirement to jump on the grenade, which implies that such reasons have requiring 
weight.  We need merely justifying altruistic reasons to explain how we can have cases 
of supererogation in which altruism is gratuitous, or not even pro tanto required.   
 
5. Are these Representational Failures Really a Problem for Single Scale? 
 Single Scale can’t (properly) represent three normative theories: dilemmas exist, the 
standard account of supererogation, and good-centered satisficing.  All that follows so far 
is that there is a problem with Single Scale or there is a problem with these three theories.  
Why blame Single Scale? 
 We are considering Single Scale insofar as it is an attempt to capture the fundamental 
model of weighing reasons.  This model is analogous to the physical equations that 
specify how forces interact to determine which direction a particle is moving.  One can 
use the correct equations (analogue: understand how reasons are to be weighed) but be 
mistaken about whether a given object exerts a certain force in a certain direction 
(analogue: be mistaken about the weight of a given reason).  Physical equations specify 
structural relationships that abstract away from particular judgments about which forces 
a given object has.  Likewise, the fundamental model of weighing reasons specifies 
 
28 This qualifies my earlier contention that the existence of supererogation does not require good-centered 
satisficing (2017: 1371-2).  Good-centered satisficing isn’t needed for the sort of supererogation that folks 
ordinarily focus on (supererogatory relief of suffering); however, it is needed to explain the sort of 
supererogation that intrigues Horgan and Timmons (supererogatory gratuitous promotion of wellbeing). 
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structural relationships that abstract away from particular judgments about what weight(s) 
a given reason has.   
 Single Scale can’t represent the relevant three theories because of Single Scale’s 
commitment to Single Proportion.  Single Proportion is a claim about the weights of 
reasons rather than the weighing of reasons.  The main problem with Single Scale, then, 
is not (merely) that it can’t represent a normative theory that is true.  Assume that the 
relevant three theories are false if you like.  The main problem is that one can reject Single 
Proportion without being confused about how to weigh reasons.  Thus, Single Scale is 
not the fundamental model of weighing reasons. 
 It will be instructive to consider a foil, a view that Single Scale can’t represent where 
we should blame the view rather than Single Scale.  To preserve the image of weighing 
one thing against another, deontic verdicts must be a function of relative weights of the 
reasons for and against.  To preserve the image, in other words, we must endorse 
something like Weight Comparativism.  Not every normative theory has this structural 
feature.  Consider: 
Absolute Weight Satisficing (AWS): φ is permissible iff the reasons for φ have a 
weight of at least 100 (no matter how much weight the reasons for ~φ have); 
otherwise, φ is impermissible. 
The proponent of Single Scale must reject AWS, because AWS assigns deontic status 
only in virtue of the total weight for φ, not the relative weights of the reasons for φ and 
for ~φ.  Thus, we are forced to choose between Single Scale—more specifically, Weight 
Comparativism—and AWS.  In this case, we should blame AWS. 
 In contrast to Single Proportion, Weight Comparativism is not a substantive 
normative judgment about the weights of reasons.  Indeed, something like it is regularly 
taken to be a structural constraint on substantive moral and rational theorizing.29  It is no 
surprise to find, then, that the proponent of AWS lacks a coherent conception of weighing 
reasons. 
 Recall that the conceptual distinction between requiring and justifying weight is 
uncontroversial.  What’s controversial is what proportion of justifying and requiring 
weight a given reason can have.  Let’s consider a version of AWS which holds that all 
reasons are balanced requiring reasons.  We discover that the total justifying weight for 
φ is 100.  AWS entails that φ is permissible no matter how much requiring weight there 
is for ~φ.  This entailment is incoherent. 
 The basic problem can be illustrated with a vector analogue to AWS, one which says 
that a particle goes down iff at least 100 units of downward force are exerted on it.  
Suppose that a total of 100 downward units are exerted.  The analogue absurdly entails 
that the particle goes down regardless of how much upward force is exerted on it.  
Numerical units of force make it easy for us to compare the downward and upward forces 
and determine which of the two opposing forces wins.  1,000 units of upward force beats 
100 units of downward force every single time. 
 The same sort of competition holds between (amounts of) justifying weight for φ and 
(amounts of) requiring weight for ~φ.  A reason’s amount of justifying weight for φ is a 
measure of how much total requiring weight for ~φ it can successfully override, i.e., how 
much total requiring weight for ~φ there can be and the reason still make φ permissible.  
A reason’s amount of requiring weight for φ is a measure of how much total justifying 
 
29 See, e.g., Chang (2016: 213-5) and Portmore (2019: 8-11). 
16 
 
weight for ~φ it can successfully override, i.e., how much justifying weight for ~φ there 
can be and the reason still make ~φ impermissible.30  Numerical values are assigned to 
justifying and requiring weight because it is an easy way to track which sort of weight 
will win when they compete.  (I inter-defined of amounts of justifying and requiring 
weight, but this is no problem as I explained in §2.1, including nt. 14.) 
 Suppose that the total justifying weight for φ is 100 (which includes any default 
justifying weight) and the total requiring weight for ~φ is 1,000.  Justifying weight for φ 
pushes φ down toward permissibility.  Requiring weight for ~φ pushes φ up toward 
impermissibility.  These weights are in direct competition and 1,000 units of weight 
toward impermissibility beats 100 units of weight toward permissibility every single time.  
In other words, the very concepts of justifying and requiring weight rule out AWS.  Their 
conceptual relationship entails that φ would be impermissible in this case (100 JWφ vs 
1,000 RW~φ), and AWS falsely entails that it would be permissible.  Perhaps a given 
version of AWS can be normatively adequate if, e.g., it assigns the correct weight to all 
reasons.  Yet no version of AWS can be structurally sound, for it misunderstands how 
reasons are to be weighed to determine a deontic status.31 
 On the surface, AWS might look no different than an absolute threshold satisficing 
consequentialism (e.g., an action is permissible iff the net aggregate wellbeing is at least 
n).  But such a satisficing consequentialism is coherent if we understand it as good-
centered satisficing (good enough is a threshold in the good) rather than weight-centered 
satisficing (good enough is a threshold in weights).  At least, this is an option if we can 
sensibly reject Single Proportion.  If satisficing consequentialism has an unavoidable 
problem, the problem is normative: it assigns weights to reasons incorrectly.32 
 We are considering Single Scale as the putative fundamental model of how reasons 
are to be weighed.  The fundamental model represents all and only those normative 
theories that weigh reasons correctly, regardless of whether they weight reasons correctly.  
Someone who endorses Absolute Weight Satisficing (an act is permissible iff there is at 
least n weight in its favor) misunderstands how reasons are to be weighed.  Consequently, 
the conflict between Single Scale (more precisely: Weight Comparativism) and AWS is 
a problem for AWS.   
 In contrast, someone who endorses good centered satisficing (e.g., one has requiring 
reason to make a life good enough but merely justifying reason to make it even better) 
need not make any mistake about how reasons are weighed.  If they make a mistake, it 
may be only a normative mistake about the weights of reasons.  Consequently, the conflict 
between Single Scale (more precisely: Single Proportion) and good-centered satisficing 
is a problem for Single Scale.  And the same point applies to Single Scale’s conflict with 
the existence of dilemmas and the standard account of supererogation.   
 
30 Cf. Gert (2007: 537-539) and Portmore (2011: 120-121). 
31 The conceptual incoherence of AWS makes it especially clear that its mistake is structural and not a 
substantive normative judgment about the weights of reasons; however, not every non-normative, structural 
mistake suffices for conceptual incoherence (e.g., Rubio’s mistake I allude to in nt. 5). 
32 Portmore (2019: 9) conflates AWS and absolute threshold satisficing consequentialism.  He accuses the 
latter of holding that, once the absolute threshold is reached, “the alternatives are irrelevant in assessing its 
moral permissibility” (9).  But that’s AWS.  On a good-centered understanding of the threshold, satisficing 
consequentialism can say that, beyond the threshold, the reasons for the alternatives get taken into account; 
it’s just that all such reasons are merely justifying. 
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 Single Scale is, therefore, not the fundamental model of weighing reasons.  Yet it is 
such a simple model, you might wonder whether we can use it anyway.  In principle, yes, 
as long as you justify its use in reference to the fundamental model, the model that sets 
the standard for what it is to weigh reasons correctly.  The goal of this justification is to 
show that Single Scale doesn’t distort the normative phenomena it is used to model.  For 
example, you might argue that Single Proportion is true and that Single Scale follows 
from the conjunction of Single Proportion and the fundamental model.  At present, 
however, the case for Single Proportion is rather thin.  It is ordinarily accepted by faith, 
not argument.  It conflicts with many otherwise plausible normative theories and 
intuitions.33  Furthermore, it might seem plausible only because Single Scale was our best 
metaphor for weighing reasons (§8).  Perhaps you are more optimistic that Single 
Proportion can be adequately defended.  Fine.  The main point is that the use of any non-
fundamental model needs justification in reference to the fundamental one, justification 
that has never been provided for Single Scale. 
 
6. Dual Scale 
 The problem with Single Scale isn’t the image of the scale, but the image of a single 
scale.  We need two scales to represent views that allow the requiring weight of non-
default reasons to vary independently of their justifying weight.  Permission Scale (for 
φ) determines whether φ is permissible by comparing the justifying weight for φ (JWφ) 
with the requiring weight for ~φ (RW~φ).  Commitment Scale (for φ) determines whether 
φ is a commitment (i.e., ~φ is impermissible) by comparing the requiring weight for φ 
(RWφ) with the justifying weight for ~φ (JW~φ).
34  The two scales working together reveal 
whether φ is a requirement (permissible commitment) or a dilemma (impermissible 
commitment).35 
 
33 In addition to the theories mentioned in §4, there are many other normative theories that cannot be 
represented in Single Scale due to its commitment to Single Proportion.  The most obvious will be any 
theory that, like the standard account of supererogation, appeals to merely justifying reasons or 
terminological variants, such as some uses of “prerogatives” (Scheffler 1982) or “mere permissions” 
(Hurka and Shubert 2012).  In this paper, I’m ignoring the possibility that we might have three or more 
options.  If I weren’t ignoring that possibility, I’d point out that Single Scale cannot represent what I regard 
as the most promising solutions to Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox (Archer 2016; Muñoz forthcoming) and 
Horton’s All or Nothing Problem (Muñoz forthcoming). 
34 The Commitment Scale for φ is just the mirror image of the Permission Scale for ~φ.  This shouldn’t be 
surprising.  Commitment to φ is just another way to talk about the impermissibility of ~φ. 
35 The vector sum analogy to weighing reasons can also be given a dual reading: it takes two vector sums 
to determine the deontic status of an act, one for permission and one for commitment. 
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fig. 2 
 This model, Dual Scale, has much in common with Single Scale.  The pans still 
represent φ and ~φ, and so we still get: 
Independent Individuation of Options: an agent’s options are individuated 
independently of what reasons the agent has and what the weights of those 
reasons are. 
The counterfactual stability of weight still applies: 
Prior Fixed Weights: The same reason has the same weight in all contexts, and 
what particular weight it has is prior to the deontic status of any particular action. 
So far the model is exactly the same as Single Scale.  It is also like Single Scale insofar 
as it has a comparative element.  Yet Weight Comparativism needs refinement.  Since it 
is conceptually possible that justifying and requiring weight are independent variables, 
the comparison isn’t as simple as the reasons for φ get weighed against the reasons against 
φ.36   
 We weigh one weight value against another only to the extent that there is competition 
between those two weight values.  Justifying and requiring weight are defined by their 
contributions to fixing deontic status.  Thus, we can clarify when justifying and requiring 
weight compete by clarifying which deontic verdicts are jointly impossible.  There is no 
competition between justifying weight for φ and justifying weight for ~φ, because deontic 
options are conceptually possible, i.e., you can be permitted to φ and permitted to ~φ.  In 
contrast, you can’t be permitted to φ and committed to ~φ.  To be committed to ~φ just 
is for φ to be impermissible.  Hence, justifying weight for φ competes with requiring 
weight for ~φ.  It is this competition that determines whether φ is permissible a la the 
Permission Scale in fig. 2. 
 Requiring weight for φ does not compete with requiring weight for ~φ.  It is at least 
a conceptual possibility that one be in a dilemma, a case in which neither φ nor ~φ is 
 
36 In discussion, some have tried to resist Dual Scale by saying that all we need is reasons for and reasons 
against, as long as we deny that reasons against φ are always reasons for ~φ.  This view just is Dual Scale 
in worse terminology.  These folks use ‘reasons for φ’ as code for justifying weight for φ (reasons that push 
an act toward permissibility) and ‘reasons against ~φ’ as code for requiring weight against ~φ (reasons that 
push ~φ toward impermissibility), and they assume that reasons for φ and reasons against ~φ need not 
always come in the same proportion.  That’s Dual Scale stated in a way that obscures that there are two 
reason for/against distinctions (justifying weight for/against and requiring weight for/against), and so it 
obscures the conceptually necessary connections between reasons for and reasons against (every reason for 
is some kind of reason against—see note 13).  
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permissible.  In contrast, you can’t be committed to φ and permitted to ~φ.  To be 
committed to φ just is for ~φ to be impermissible.  Hence, requiring weight for φ competes 
with justifying weight for ~φ.  It is this competition that determines whether φ is a 
commitment a la Commitment Scale in fig. 2.   
 Now that we better understand what competes with what, we can replace Weight 
Comparativism with: 
Dual Weight Comparativism:  
i. Whether φ is permissible is determined by comparing the justifying weight 
of all reasons for φ with the requiring weight of all reasons for ~φ. 
ii. Whether φ is a commitment is determined by comparing the requiring 
weight of all reasons for φ with the justifying weight of all reasons for ~φ. 
Like Single Scale, Dual Scale is officially neutral on which particular relative weights are 
assigned to a given deontic status.  For illustrative purposes, I work with: 
Permission Assignment: φ is permissible iff the justifying weight of all reasons 
for φ is at least as weighty as the requiring weight of all reasons for ~φ. 
Commitment Assignment: φ is a commitment iff the requiring weight of all 
reasons for φ is weightier than the justifying weight of all reasons for ~φ. 
Whether you opt for these assignment functions or not, you must coordinate the 
assignments for permissions and commitments, because the two assignment functions 
interact.  If you are permitted to φ, then ~φ isn’t a commitment.  If φ is a commitment, 
then you aren’t permitted to ~φ.  Once I endorsed the “at least as weighty” language in 
Permission Assignment, I had to endorse the “weightier than” language of Commitment 
Assignment.  This coordination ensures that there are no gaps in the deontic assignments 
(every act is permissible or impermissible) and there are no overlap (no act is both 
permissible and impermissible).37,38 
 Like Single Scale, Dual Scale will need to be combined with whatever the correct 
aggregation principle happens to be.  The scale metaphor suggests that the correct 
principle will be additive (the justifying weight of all reasons is the sum total justifying 
weight of the individual reasons, and the requiring weight of all reasons is the sum total 
requiring weight of the individual reasons).  Since there are many worries about additive 
aggregation and the other aspects of Dual Scale can survive even if additive aggregation 
doesn’t, I don’t build additive aggregation into Dual Scale. 
 
37 The interaction is due to a specific mathematical relationship.  Permission Assignment holds that φ is 
permissible iff the net justifying weight for it (justifying weight for φ – requiring weight for ~φ) is at least 
0.  Commitment Assignment holds that ~φ is a commitment iff the net requiring weight for it (requiring 
weight for ~φ – justifying weight for φ) is greater than 0.  The net justifying weight for φ and the net 
requiring weight for ~φ subtract the same two things in different order; therefore, they are additive inverses 
of each other.  If the net justifying weight for φ is 1, the net requiring weight for ~φ is ~1.  Given that a net 
justifying weight of at least 0 is the cut-off for permission: (i) to ensure that every action is assigned a 
deontic status, I had to assume that any net requiring weight for φ of greater than 0 (net justifying weight 
for ~φ of less than 0) is sufficient for commitment to φ, and (ii) to ensure that no action is both permissible 
and impermissible, I had to assume that a net requiring weight for φ of greater than 0 (justifying weight for 
~φ of less than 0) is necessary for commitment to φ. 
38 Thanks to the mathematical relationship in the previous footnote, the standard account of supererogation 
entails Dual Scale.  Elsewhere I argue for this at length, but here’s a summary: (i) the standard account of 
supererogation entails Permission Assignment, and (ii) Permission Assignment entails Commitment 
Assignment.   
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 Single Scale is the conjunction of four theses: Independent Individuation of Options, 
Prior Fixed Weights, Weight Comparativism, and Single Proportion.  Dual Scale is the 
conjunction of three theses: Independent Individuation of Options, Prior Fixed Weights, 
and Dual Weight Comparativism.  Dual Scale has no analogue for Single Proportion.  
That’s because Single Proportion is a substantive normative judgment and has no 
business in an attempt to capture the fundamental model of weighing reasons. 
 As I present it here, Dual Scale needs refinement and/or development in at least three 
ways.  First, it must be generalized to handle cases in which there are three or more 
options.  The basic idea of the generalization is simple enough.  The above simple 
Permission Assignment holds that φ is permissible iff it wins a single competition with a 
single alternative (JWφ ≥ RW~φ).  The generalized Permission Assignment holds that φ is 
permissible iff it wins a tournament, a pairwise competition with each alternative (for 
each alternative A, JWφ ≥ RWA).  The same point applies to the generalized Commitment 
Assignment: φ is a commitment iff φ wins a tournament, a pairwise competition with 
each alternative (for each alternative A, RWφ > JWA).  But there are some complications 
that I can’t address here.39  Second, it assumes that every reason against φ is some sort of 
reason for ~φ, which some regard as a problematic assumption (Snedegar 2018).40  Third, 
Dual Scale can and should be refined to allow for conditions and modifiers.41  These 
refinements must wait for another occasion.  Now that we know what Dual Scale is, let’s 
see what it can do. 
 
7. The Advantages of Dual Scale 
 
7.1. Anything Single Scale Does, Dual Scale Does Better 
 Recall that Single Scale can represent maximizing views using Max and two distinct 
non-maximizing views: the justifying heavy requiring reason view (Relative Weight 
Satisficing) and the default merely justifying reason view (Default Reason Satisficing).  
Max holds (i) that all non-default reasons are balanced and (ii) that the (default) bias 
toward permissibility holds only when reasons are perfectly counterbalanced.  Relative 
Weight Satisficing rejects (i) and Default Reason Satisficing rejects (ii).  The first 
disagreement looks like a disagreement about the weights of non-default reasons and the 
second looks like a disagreement about the weights of default reasons.  Single Scale 
obscures these differences, because it can represent normative disagreements in only one 
way, namely by modifying the function that assigns deontic status to relative weights.  
Thus, the representation of normative disagreements is taken “off-image”. 
 
39 One complication is that this basic idea can’t represent the conceptual possibility that ever better cases 
(for every option, there is another better) are dilemmas.  If ever better cases are dilemmas, then every option 
is trivially a commitment: you make a mistake if you don’t choose that option, because you make a mistake 
no matter which option you choose.  The generalized Commitment Assignment incorrectly entails that no 
option is a commitment: for any φ, RWφ is less than the justifying weight of some alternative.  Another 
complication is that justifying and requiring weight are relative to pairwise competitions between φ and 
each alternative.  Consequently, JWφ can vary for non-holist reasons as you vary the alternative (manuscript 
§6).  This is because every reason against an alternative is functionally equivalent to a reason for φ (recall 
nt 13).  If there is more justifying weight against alternative A1 than alternative A2, then there is more JWφ 
in φ’s pairwise competition with A1 than in φ’s pairwise competition with A2. 
40 The alleged problem depends on a false view of the relationship between reasons for and against.  I have 
a separate paper addressing these issues.  Yet again recall footnote 13. 
41 See note 12 for a brief explanation of the sort of refinement I have in mind. 
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 Dual Scale can represent normative disagreements in different ways, and it can 
represent normative disagreements “on-image”.  It represents the disagreement about the 
weights of non-default reasons by changing what goes on the scales.  Maximizing views 
hold that only balanced requiring reasons go on the scales.  So whatever justifying weight 
you assign to the reason for φ on Permission Scale, you assign the same requiring weight 
to that reason on Commitment Scale.  If JWφ = 10, then RWφ = 10.   
 
fig. 3 
(A requiring reason for ~φ would be represented by assigning the same weight to RW~φ 
and JW~φ.)  Relative Weight Satisficing, in contrast, holds that whatever justifying weight 
goes on Permission Scale, you assign half to the requiring weight on Commitment Scale.  
If JWφ = 10, then RWφ = 5.  
 
fig. 4 
This way of representing the disagreement illustrates that it is about the weights of non-
default reasons.  (A justifying heavy requiring reason to ~φ would be represented by 
assigning half the weight to RW~φ that you assign to JW~φ.) 
 Single Scale couldn’t represent disagreements about non-default reasons on-image 
because the φ side goes down exactly to the extent that the ~φ side goes up.  It had to 
represent the disagreement between Max and Relative Weight Satisficing by modifying 
the assignment function.  Since Dual Scale uses one scale for permission and another for 
commitment, it allows the justifying weight of non-default reasons to differ from their 
requiring weight.  And that’s what we need to represent on the image of the scale(s) the 
difference between balanced and justifying heavy requiring reasons. 
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 Dual Scale has two different ways of representing disagreements about the default 
bias toward permissibility.  It can represent it off-image like Single Scale does, by 
modifying the assignment function.  It can also represent it on-image by having the scales 
begin in a state of bias toward permissibility for both φ and ~φ (remember default reasons 
are reasons for every act in every situation).  Maximizing views have both Permission 
and Commitment Scales begin in the counterbalanced state before you add non-default 
reasons to the pans.  A default merely justifying reason can be represented by biasing 
Permission Scale 5 units in φ’s favor and Commitment Scale 5 units in ~φ’s favor before 
non-default reasons are added.  (Remember that the two scales must be coordinated.  If 
you bias Permission Scale toward φ without equally biasing Commitment Scale toward 
~φ, it will be possible for an action’s deontic status to change simply by changing whether 
it counts as φ or ~φ.)  The starting positions of the two biased scales will then resemble 
fig. 5. 
 
fig. 5 
 You couldn’t represent the default reason strategy on-image in Single Scale because 
it represented both permissibility and commitment on the same scale.  If you biased the 
scale toward φ’s being permissible, you thereby biased the scale toward ~φ’s being 
impermissible.  Since Dual Scale uses one scale for permission and another for 
commitment, it allows the default justifying weight in favor of φ to vary independently 
of the default requiring weight for φ.  And this is exactly what we need to represent on 
the image of the scales disagreements about how weighty the default bias toward 
permissibility is.  
 
7.2. Dual Scale Represents What Single Scale Can’t 
 To illustrate how Dual Scale represents what Single Scale can’t, it will be helpful to 
convert the dual scale image into the following matrix: 
Dual Scale Matrix 
Permission Scale Commitment Scale 
JWφ RW~φ RWφ JW~φ 
Verdict: permissible/impermissible Verdict: commitment/not a commitment 
Combined verdict: (im)permissible (but not a) commitment 
 
The first row identifies the two scales.  The second row tracks the weights of the relevant 
non-default reasons.  The third tracks the verdicts of each individual scale.  The fourth 
combines those verdicts to yield the combined deontic status of an act, which depends on 
both whether the act is permissible and whether it is a commitment.  (This matrix assumes 
that the default bias toward permissibility holds only in the case of counterbalanced 
reasons.  If we wanted to represent alternative accounts of default reasons, we could add 
a new row between the first and second to track disagreements about default weight.) 
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 Dilemmas.  I stupidly make it my deepest aim to punch every brick wall I find as hard 
as I can.  I find a brick wall.  If this case is a dilemma, how could we explain why it is a 
dilemma?  My two options are to Punch or ~Punch.  The harm of punching the brick wall 
is, say, a balanced requiring reason not to punch the wall (50 JW~Punch and 50 RW~Punch).  
Stupid aims have no capacity to justify, i.e., they lack justifying weight, but even stupid 
aims can commit you to an action, i.e., they have requiring weight.  In other words, the 
stupid aim is a merely requiring reason, a reason that has requiring weight but no 
justifying weight.  Since it is your deepest aim, it has more requiring weight than the harm 
has justifying weight not to (0 JWPunch and 100 RWPunch). 
 Dual Scale represents this dilemma as follows.  Permission Scale tells us that 
punching the wall isn’t permissible.  My reason to punch the wall has no justifying weight 
and my reason not to has considerable requiring weight (0 JWPunch < 50 RW~Punch).  Yet 
Commitment Scale says that punching the wall is a commitment.  My reason to punch 
the wall has more requiring weight than my reason not to has justifying weight (100 
RWPunch > 50 JW~Punch).  So punching the wall is an impermissible commitment and my 
stupid aim has put me in a dilemma. 
 
(when assessing the deontic status of Punch) 
Permission Scale Commitment Scale 
0 JWPunch 50 RW~Punch 100 RWPunch 50 JW~Punch 
Verdict: Punch is impermissible Verdict: Punch is a commitment 
Combined verdict: Punch is an impermissible commitment (dilemma) 
 
 Sometimes ethicists distinguish between requirement dilemmas (both φ and ~φ are 
required) and prohibition dilemmas (both φ and ~φ are impermissible).  I have shown that 
Dual Scale can represent the latter, but not the former.  Is that a problem?  No.  Given the 
sense of ‘requirement’ in the paper, requirement dilemmas are conceptually impossible.  
In §2.1, following Dorsey and Portmore, we defined ‘requirement to φ’ as a compound 
deontic verdict of permissible to φ and impermissible to ~φ.  Thus, a requirement to φ 
entails that ~φ is not permissible and so not required. 
 
 Standard Account of Supererogation. Liv must choose whether to sacrifice her life 
(Sacrifice) or remain in safety (Safety).  The standard account of supererogation treats 
altruistic reasons, such as the lives of the five soldiers, as requiring reasons (say, 500 
JWSacrifice and 500 RWSacrifice).  The account treats self-interested reasons, such as the 
value of her life, as very weighty merely justifying reasons (say, 1,000 JWSafety and 0 
RWSafety).   
 Permission Scale entails that the sacrificial act is permissible, because the justifying 
weight of Liv’s altruistic reason is weightier than the non-existent requiring weight of her 
self-interested reason (500 JWSacrifice > 0 RWSafety).  Commitment Scale entails that 
Sacrifice isn’t a commitment, because the requiring weight of the altruistic reason is 
outweighed by the justifying weight of her self-interested reason (500 RWSacrifice < 1,000 
JWSafety).   
(when assessing deontic status of Sacrifice) 
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Permission Scale Commitment Scale 
500 JWSacrifice 0 RWSafety 500 RWSacrifice 1,000 JWSafety 
Verdict: Sacrifice is permissible Verdict: Sacrifice is not a commitment 
Combined verdict: Sacrifice is permissible but not required 
 
Since the altruistic act is permissible but not a commitment (and so not required), one 
goes beyond the call of duty in performing it.  At least, one goes beyond the call on the 
plausible assumption that it is morally better to save the five soldiers than to save one’s 
own life. 
 
 Good-Centered Satisficing.  Suppose that 100 units of wellbeing is the threshold for 
the good enough.  Good-centered satisficers generally hold that if you have to choose 
between Good Enough (100 units of wellbeing) and Not Good Enough (95 units of 
wellbeing), you are required to choose Good Enough.  That’s because this kind of 
satisficer generally assumes that one has balanced requiring reason to promote wellbeing 
all the way up to the good enough.  This assumption gives us something like this: there is 
95 JW and RW for Not Good Enough and 100 JW and RW for Good Enough. 
 When we plug these values into Dual Scale, Permission Scale tells us that choosing 
Good Enough is permissible, because the justifying weight for Good Enough is greater 
than requiring weight for Not Good Enough (100 JWGE > 95 RWNGE).  Commitment Scale 
tells us that Good Enough is also a commitment, because the requiring weight for Good 
Enough is greater than the justifying weight for Not Good Enough (100 RWGE > 95 
JWNGE).   
(when assessing deontic status of GE relative to NGE) 
Permission Scale Commitment Scale 
100 JWGE 95 RWNGE 100 RWGE 95 JWNGE 
Verdict: GE is permissible Verdict: GE is a commitment 
Combined verdict: GE is required (a permissible commitment) 
 
 On the other hand, if you are choosing between Good Enough (100 units of wellbeing) 
and Even better (105 units of wellbeing), you are permitted but not required to choose 
Good Enough.  Even Better is better than Good Enough, so you have more justifying 
weight to choose it (105 JWEB vs 100 JWGE).  Yet the good-centered satisficer’s view is 
that requiring weight stops at the good enough amount of wellbeing (beyond the good 
enough threshold any additional reason is merely justifying).  Consequently, there is no 
more requiring weight to choose Even Better than there is to choose Good Enough (100 
RWEB vs 100 RWGE).  Let’s plug these numbers into Dual Scale. 
 Permission Scale tells us that choosing Good Enough is permissible because the 
justifying weight for Good Enough is equal to the requiring weight for Not Good Enough 
(100 JWGE = 100 RWEB).  Commitment Scale tells us that Good Enough is not a 
commitment, because the requiring weight for Good Enough is less than the justifying 
weight for Even Better (100 RWGE < 105 JWEB). 
(when assessing deontic status of GE relative to Even Better) 
Permission Scale Commitment Scale 
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100 JWGE 100 RWEB 100 RWGE 105 JWEB 
Verdict: GE is permissible Verdict: GE is not a commitment 
Combined verdict: GE is permissible but not required 
 
8. Counteracting Single Scale’s Distorting Influence  
 Inapt but salient metaphors can distort our theorizing, even in the face of compelling 
counterarguments.42  When our best metaphor for weighing reasons is Single Scale (and 
the related single vector sum), Single Proportion seems like a default assumption of 
normative inquiry, if not a constraint on the coherent weighing of reasons.   
 Some actions are required, so there must be requiring reasons.  The standard account 
of supererogation and good-centered satisficing claim that there are also merely justifying 
reasons.  This is clearly a coherent normative claim, and we’ve seen how easily it can be 
represented in Dual Scale.  When relying on Single Scale, however, it is easy for 
intelligent philosophers to conclude that merely justifying reasons don’t even make sense: 
I simply do not understand how a reason could be [merely justifying].  To be a 
reason is to support a particular course of action.  For a reason to be [merely 
justifying], however, it would have to be rationally justifiable for the agent to 
neglect that support.  But if that support is genuine, I cannot see how such neglect 
could be justified.  It would not be implausible, then, to suspect that we cannot 
give a coherent account of [merely justifying] reasons.  (Kagan 1989: 381) 
Kagan is thinking with Single Scale: to the extent that a reason supports a course of action 
(pushes the φ-pan down), it also counts against not doing that action (pushes the ~φ-pan 
up).  Single Scale rules out (non-default) merely justifying reasons.  So it’s no surprise 
that he can’t see how they are coherent.  
 Single Scale has also obscured good-centered satisficing.  When you are working with 
Single Scale, the only way to understand the good enough is to think about it as a 
threshold within relative weight.  To understand the good enough as a threshold within, 
say, wellbeing, you need to make sense of the possibility that wellbeing can provide both 
requiring and merely justifying reasons.  But you can’t make sense of such a possibility 
when you reason with Single Scale and its commitment to Single Proportion.  It is no 
surprise, then, that philosophers tend to ignore good-centered satisficing when they 
discuss weighing reasons.43,44 
 I have emphasized Dual Scale’s handy visualizations because they counteract the 
distorting influence of Single Scale.  They give us a new, more accurate image/metaphor 
to think with.  In any event, Dual Scale has a much better claim to being the fundamental 
 
42 At least, this is suggested by the psychological research on the availability heuristic. 
43 In discussions of weighing reasons, satisficing comes up almost exclusively as an assignment of deontic 
status to relative weight, one that is a non-maximizing alternative to Max (e.g., Berker 2007: 136; Dorsey 
2016: 10-11).  That’s weight-centered satisficing.  This focus leads Gert to take the failure of Single Scale 
to be a failure of satisficing theory (2007: 535).  Even Slote’s (1989) defense of satisficing shies away from 
the merely justifying reasons of good-centered satisficing (see my 2017: 1372, nt. 10 for an explanation). 
44 When you reason with Single Scale, an absolute threshold version of good-centered satisficing might 
look especially suspicious.  The discussion of Absolute Weight Satisficing revealed that an absolute 
threshold in the weights of reasons was incoherent, because such a threshold is incompatible with anything 
in the neighborhood of Weight Comparativism.  Since Single Scale can represent only weight-centered 
satisficing, it is easy to infer that no version of absolute threshold satisficing is coherent.  (Cf. Portmore’s 
conflation discussed in nt 32 above.) 
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model of weighing reasons.  It can easily weigh the merely justifying reasons needed for 
the standard account of supererogation and good-centered satisficing.  It can easily weigh 
the requiring heavy reasons needed for dilemmas.  Perhaps there are problems with these 
normative theories and any other rejection of Single Proportion.  Yet Dual Scale shows 
that these theories make sense and that they can weigh reasons correctly. 
 
Conclusion 
 The fundamental model of weighing reasons determines what it is to weigh reasons 
correctly.  By endorsing Single Proportion, Single Scale takes a substantive normative 
stand on which weights a reason can have.  One can reject this stand without being 
confused about how reasons are to be weighed.  Dual Scale distills and refines the 
promising structural content of Single Scale, and it can represent a much broader range 
of normative theories.  Dual Scale is a crucial step in our search for the fundamental 
model of weighing reasons.  It needs refinement to deal with holist challenges and choice 
contexts with any number of options, but I submit that it approximates the fundamental 
model.  It is commonly assumed that the metaphors of weight and weighing are apt for 
morality and rationality.  If so, then Dual Scale helps us better understand what is and is 
not a structural constraint on substantive moral and rational theorizing.45 
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